Criteria to scrutinize new rights: protecting rights against artificial proliferation
| Autor | Luisa Netto |
| Cargo | Assistant Professor of Law Economics and Government at Utrecht University School of Law (Utrecht, Netherlands). Postdoc researcher at Leiden University |
| Páginas | 11-75 |
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v8i1.82654
11
Criteria to scrutinize new rights: protecting
rights against articial proliferation
Critérios para testar novos direitos: protegendo os
direitos contra uma proliferação articial
LUÍSA NETTO I, *
I Utrecht University (Utrecht, Netherlands)
lcpnetto@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2379-8188
Recebido/Received: 18.02.2020 / February 18th, 2020
Aprovado/Approved: 04.12.2020 / December 4th, 2020
Abstract
Human and fundamental rights are powerful legal means
to protect and promote human dignity. On the one hand,
the recognition of implicit and new rights appears un-
avoidable and desirable as history and its evolving cir-
cumstances permanently present new challenges to hu-
man dignity. On the other hand, an articial proliferation
of rights can weaken rights’ legal and political worth. The
rights system cannot expand limitless, hence criteria to
test new rights must be construed in the search of ad-
equate parameters to update the system. These criteria
should reveal the presence of substantial fundamentality
in rights not explicitly or formally enshrined in the consti-
tutional text. The testing path of new rights is conceived
as a discursive process which reinforces the mutual rela-
tion between rights and democracy.
Keywords: fundamental and human rights; rights sys-
tem; new rights; scrutinizing criteria; substantial funda-
mentality; rights overreach; democracy and rights.
Resumo
Os direitos humanos e fundamentais são poderosos instru-
mentos jurídicos para proteger e promover a dignidade da
pessoa humana. Por um lado, o reconhecimento de direitos
implícitos e novos direitos se mostra inevitável e desejável,
uma vez que o evolver histórico sempre coloca renovados
desaos à dignidade da pessoa humana. Por outro lado,
uma proliferação articial de direitos pode enfraquecer seu
valor jurídico e político. O sistema de direitos não pode se
expandir de forma ilimitada; é então necessária a constru-
ção de critérios para buscar uma adequada parametrização
da atualização desse sistema. Esses critérios devem revelar
a presença de fundamentalidade material em direitos que
não foram previstos de maneira expressa no texto consti-
tucional. O caminho para testar novos direitos é concebido
como um processo discursivo que reforça a relação mútua
entre direitos e democracia.
Palavras-chave: direito fundamentais e humanos;
sistema de direitos; novos direitos; critérios para testar
novos direitos; fundamentalidade material; proliferação de
direitos; democracia e direitos.
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: : NETTO, Luísa. Criteria to scrutinize new rights: protecting rights against articial
proliferation. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021. DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v8i1.82654.
* Assistant Professor of Law Economics and Government at Utrecht University School of Law (Utrecht, Netherlands). Postdoc
researcher at Leiden University. Holds a Ph.D in Law from Lisbon University. Email: lcpnetto@gmail.com.
LUÍSA NETTO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021.
12
CONTENTS
1. Introduction; 2. The legal system of the constitutional state and the fundamental rights; 3. The fun-
damental rights system of the constitutional state; 4. The openness of the fundamental rights system
– compensatory constitutionalization of rights; 5. Openness and closure of the fundamental rights sys-
tem – criteria for approaching substantial fundamentality; 6. Closing remarks; 7. References.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is built upon the characterization of the fundamental rights system
in the constitutional state. In such state – based on the principles of rule of law, democ-
racy and welfare –, human dignity assumes the central role in the legal order. Human
dignity is concretized by fundamental rights, which are not conned to a subjective
dimension nor to the classical public liberties. Fundamental rights embrace the ex-
pansive potentialities of dignity, which constantly faces new necessities and threats.
The protection of dignity, hence, requires the permanent updating of the fundamental
rights system, imposing its construction as an open system.
The conception of openness developed in the paper cannot be reduced to the
existence of explicit open clauses, often present in contemporary constitutions, it iden-
ties a much broader phenomenon. Openness manifests itself in the interpretation and
creation of norms through dierent paths – structural, derived from an implicit princi-
ple of openness, and resulting from the interaction between national law and interna-
tional law –, and counting on various ways of realization. Openness enables to welcome
implicit and new rights into the system1.
The acknowledgment of the open character of the system has multiple conse-
quences to this very system, such as the danger of an articial recognition of funda-
mental rights, and to the constitutional system, namely to the separation of powers
and constitutional normativity. Openness presents the risk of weakening these systems’
normative force.
The paper is an attempt to oer theoretical foundations to the openness of the
fundamental rights system. The goal is to preserve the core values and elements of the
1 The core ideas concerning the open nature of the fundamental rights system were initially developed in
my Ph.D thesis (NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. A abertura do sistema de direitos fundamentais do Estado
Constitucional. Curitiba: Íthala, 2016).
The original argumentation is being revisited and enriched during the postdoc research periods at the Amster-
dam Centre for International Law, Amsterdam University (ACIL – UvA), and at Leiden University. These postdoc
periods were made possible due to institutional support provided by the General State Attorney Oce for the
state of Minas Gerais, the Catholic University of Minas Gerais, and by the universities of Amsterdam and Leiden,
where I was welcomed by Professor Yvonne Donders and Professor Wim Voermans, respectively.
The present paper aims to update and deepen those ideas, putting them into discussion within a broader En-
glish-speaking audience. New insights and argumentation regard especially the international law on human
rights, the relation between rights and democracy, and the challenges posed by an alleged rights overreach.
Relevant literature has also been incorporated.
Criteria to scrutinize new rights
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021. 13
system and prevent the denaturation of the concept of fundamental rights. The system
of fundamental rights cannot expand limitless; openness must be combined with some
degree of closure, protecting rights against articial proliferation.
This is the challenge the paper aims to face; to present and discuss some criteria
to identify the substantial fundamentality in rights which are not formally enshrined in
constitutional provisions. These criteria should guide the test of new rights which claim
compensatory constitutionalization, parametrizing the update of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. The rst section oers the underlying con-
ception of the legal system of the constitutional state. The second section provides an
overview of the fundamental rights system, exposing its axial elements. The third sec-
tion presents the understanding of the openness of the fundamental rights system,
explaining how the compensatory constitutionalization of new rights can occur. The
fourth section delves into the criteria developed to test the substantial fundamentality
of new rights. At the end some closing remarks are advanced pointing to possible fur-
ther research paths.
2. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The possible institutional scenario needed to approach the theme can be draf-
ted departing from the generic concept of a democratic nation, suggested by Mark
Tushnet2; a state built upon the principles of (i) the rule of law3, (ii) democracy4 and (iii)
2 TUSHNET, Mark. Weak courts, strong rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
3 SANCHÍS, Luis Prieto. Justicia constitucional y derechos fundamentales. Madrid: Trotta, 2003, p. 12-
13/25; GRIMM, Dieter. The achievement of constitutionalism and its prospects in a changed world. In: DOBNER,
Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 10; ALLAN, T. R. S.. Con-
stitutional rights and the rule of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of
Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 132-142.
4 HABERMAS, Jürgen. The inclusion of the other: studies in political theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998;
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro,
2012. p. 144-146; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef;
KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 22 ss;
HESSE, Konrad. Signicado de los derechos fundamentales. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, Hans-
-Jochen; HESSE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial Pons,
2001, p. 89-90; BÖCKENFÖRDE, Ernest-Wolfgang. Estudios sobre el Estado de Derecho y la democracia. Ma-
drid: Trotta, 2000, p. 92 ss; WALDRON, Jeremy. Derecho y desacuerdos. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005;DWORKIN,
Ronald. Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978; ALEXY, Robert. Comments and
responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Ox-
ford, 2012, p. 330; ALEXY, Robert. La institucionalización de los derechos humanos en el Estado constitucional
democrático. Derechos y libertades: Revista del Instituto Bartolomé de las Casas. Madrid, ano V, n. 8, ene./
jun., 2000, p. 40; ALEXY, Robert. Basic rights and democracy in Jürgen Habermas’s procedural paradigm of the
law. Ratio juris, v. 7, n. 2, jul., 1994, p. 232-235; PULIDO, Carlos Bernal. El principio de proporcionalidad y los
derechos fundamentales: el principio de proporcionalidad como criterio para determinar el contenido de los
derechos fundamentales vinculante para el Legislador. 3.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Políticos y Constitu-
cionales, 2007, p. 203-206; BOROWSKI, Martin. La restricción de los derechos fundamentales. Revista Española
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