Exploring the wonderful mystery of time: 'lack of grounds' in the constitutional judicial review as an evidence of passive virtues in the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF)
| Autor | Flávia Danielle Santiago Lima - José Mário Wanderley Gomes - Leon Victor Queiroz Barbosa |
| Cargo | Doutora e Mestre em Direito Público pela Faculdade de Direito do Recife (FDR) da Universidade Federal de Pernambuco/UFPE. Professora da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Pernambuco (FCAP/UPE, campus Benfica/Recife) e da Universidade Católica de Pernambuco (UNICAP). Professora permanente dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Direito da FDR/UFP... |
| Páginas | 21-36 |
Revista Direito e Justiça: Reflexões Sociojurídicas, Santo Ângelo, v. 18, n. 30, jan./abr. 2018.
21
EXPLORING THE WONDERFUL MYSTERY OF TIME: “LACK OF
GROUNDS” IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN
EVIDENCE OF PASSIVE VIRTUES IN THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME
COURT (STF)
Flávia Danielle Santiago Lima1
UFPE; UNICAP, Recife, PE, Brasil
José Mário Wanderley Gomes2
UNICAP, Recife, PE, Brasil
Leon Victor Queiroz Barbosa3
UFCG, Campina Grande , PB, Brasil
Sumary: Introdution. 1 Judicialization of politics and omission
behavior in judi cial review: Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues. 2 Coincidence
or strategy: supervening “lac k of ground s” in abstract judicial review. 3
"Passive virtues" in a ction: which factors influence the decision for la ck of
grounds? Conclusions. Reference s.
Abstract: Has the Bra zilian Supreme Court (STF) used formal
arguments to evad e the judgment of conflict s submitted by the con centrated
judicial review? Over the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has denied trial to a
growing number of cases, citing the presence o f formal defects, mainly due to
the so-called incidental “ lack of ground s": when, owin g to the delay in
assessing the conflict, allu ded legal standard ceases to exist or hav e effect. This
research starts from the Bickel’s hypothesis (1962): courts deliberately use
passive virtues – self-restri ction techniques, u sually of proc edural nature,
which provide the court with t he option to a void the assessment of a case – in
order to seek to understand the "lack of grounds" institutional phenomenon. In
this sense, data from the Bra zilian Supreme Court’s on the cases on which the
"lack of grounds" was har vested w ere su bjected o f statistical inference s, in
order to explain, through modelin g, this omission behavior of the Court.
Keywords: judicial review; judicialization of politics; self-restri ction;
“lack of grounds”.
1 Doutora e Mestre em Direito Público pela Faculdade de Di reito do Recife (FDR) da Universidade
Federal de Pernambuco/UFPE. Professora da Fa culdade de Direito da Universidade de Pernambuco
(FCAP/UPE, campus Benfica/Recife) e da Universidade Católica de Pernambuco (UNICA P). Professora
permanente do s Programas de Pós-Graduação em Direito da FDR /UFPE (Mestrado e Doutorado). Líder
do Gru po de Pesquisa JUSPOL - Judicialização, D iálogos Co nstitucionais e Política (Direito/UPE), e
Pesquisadora nos Grupos LOGOS (Direito/UNIC AP) e PR AETOR - Grupo de estudos sobre Poder
Judiciário, Política e Sociedade (Ciência Política/UFPE), registrados no Diretório Geral de Gru pos de
Pesquisa do CNPQ. Advogada da União, de sde 2 003 (AGU). Áreas de pesquisa: Judicialização da
Política, Ativismo Judicial, Política Ju dicial, Diálogos Institucionais e Políticas Públi cas.
2 Doutor em Ciência Política pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. Mestre em Direito pela
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. Advogado. Cientista Político. Professor e Pesquisador do
PRAETOR - Grupo de estudo s sobre Poder Judiciário, Política e Sociedade (UFPE) e do LOGO S -
Processo, Linguagem e Tecnologia (UNICAP). Atualmente é professor da Universidad e Cat ólica d e
Pernambuco.
3 Doutor e Mestre em C iência Política pela UFPE. Profe ssor Adjunto da Universidade Federal de
Campina Grande, professor e vice-coordenador do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política,
Editor da Revista Estudos de Política (REPOL - UACS/UFCG). Pe squisador do Centro de Estudos
Legislativos da UFMG e do PRAETOR - Grup o de estudos sobre Poder Judiciário, Política e Sociedad e
(UFPE). Especialista em Direito T ributário pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Tributári os.
Revista Direito e Justiça: Reflexões Sociojurídicas, Santo Ângelo, v. 18, n. 30, jan./abr. 2018.
22
"The jurisprudence of this Supre me Court has no divergence o n supervening
lack of ground as prejudicial to th e continuity of the ADI when befalls re peal
or substantial amendment of the law in question on its constitutiona lity". Min.
Luiz Fux, ADI 4061.
INTRODUCTION
In Brazil, in the judicial review system it is allowed to obtain statements
directly from the Highest Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF) through specific
legal instruments, which use is restricted by the Constitution to a group of few
relevant political actors, such as the President, political parties and the Attorney
General (TAYLOR, 2008).
The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 provides a number of tools to
start a concentrated constitutional review, among which one with greater use and
relevance in the legal and political scenarios is the ação direta de
inconstitucionalidade (ADI), proposed more than five th ousand times throughout
more than twenty years of th e Federal Constitution existence, covering highly
relevant issues under federal and state law (TAYLOR, 2008; VIANNA et al., 1999).
To understand the political consequences of the judicial behavior and the
judicial review, as well as the variations of these consequences as well as the
institutional arrangements, and the historical-political contexts involved, is presented
as a profitable research agenda of social scientists of our time.
In this sense, judicial review is identified by most studies in Law and
Political Science as a contingent activity of the political game (TAYLOR; DA ROS,
2008), e.g., as a potential alternative strategy to interests defeated in the legislative
sphere, in order to obtain the judicial application of c onstitutional limits on
legislative activity.
However, original data collected from the Brazilian Supreme Court’s
decisions in ADI cases point in the opposite direction: the self-restraint. Th e Court
has demonstrated, over the past twenty years, a cooperative trend with the interests
of the Executive branch, when triggered by constitutional review mechanisms
(judicial r eview), whether confirming the constitutionality of legislation, or
informally, simply by letting a large number of conflicts without judgment.
Take for example the following situation: on the date of October 30, 2013,
was issued Federal Law # 12,875, whose content changed a previous Federal Law #
9.504 (laying down general rules on elections), setting new criteria for the
distribution among the various political parties and coalitions, the schedule for the
dissemination of free electoral propaganda by radio and television.
Dissatisfied with the criteria and feeling harmed by the alleged loss of time
space in the free electoral propaganda and therefore, its importance in possible
future electoral coalitions, the Partido Republicano Progressista - PRP pleaded on
September 4, 2014, the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade (ADI) # 5159, alleging
the unconstitutionality of these standards on the proportional division of the party's
time on radio and television.
Para continuar a ler
PEÇA SUA AVALIAÇÃO