The mild weapon of the crown: making the constitutional value of pardon with public opinion and the interference of the moderating power over the judiciary (Brazil, 1823-1889)
| Autor | Arthur Barrêtto de Almeida Costa |
| Cargo | PhD candidate in Teoria e Storia del Diritto at Università degli Studi di Firenze |
| Páginas | 84-109 |
The mild weapon of the crown: making
the constitutional value of pardon with
public opinion and the interference of the
moderating power over the judiciary
(Brazil, 1823-1889)
A doce arma da coroa: o valor constitucional do direito de
graça efetiva-se na opinião pública e na interferência do
poder moderador sobre o judiciário (Brasil, 1823-1889)
Arthur Barrêtto de Almeida Costa*
Università degli Studi di Firenze, Florence, Italy
Y pues es el fausto día/ que se cumple el año vuestro/ de dar perdón al
convicto/ y dar libertad al preso/ (...)/ Vos sois príncipe cristiano/ y yo,
por mi estado, debo/ pediros lo más benigno/ y vos no usar lo sangriento./
Muerte puede dar cualquiera;/ vida, sólo puede hacerlo/
Díos: luego sólo con darla/ podéis a Díos pareceros
Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Inundacion Castálida (1689). Con ocasión de
celebrar el primer año que cumplió el hijo del señor virrey, le pide a su
excelencia indulto para un reo, vv. 161-164; 181-188
1. Introduction: the foundations of a double-faced institution
Freedom and imprisonment. Benign and bloody. Death and life. The poetry
of Sor Juana Inés de La Cruz, exquisitely baroque as it could only be, tes-
tifies the incessant clash of opposites. This Mexican nun from the Spanish
siglo de oro embodied in her own life and work the contrasts that pervaded
*PhD candidate in Teoria e Storia del Diritto at Università degli Studi di Firenze. Master and Bache-
lor of Law at Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Member of Studium Iuris – Research Group on
the History of Legal Culture (CNPq/UFMG). Email: arthurbarretto@gmail.com. Orcid: 0000-
0002-6906-0998.
Direito, Estado e Sociedade n.59 p. 84 a 109 jul/dez 2021
85
Direito, Estado e Sociedade n. 59 jul/dez 2021
her poems: writer of pieces of religious devotion and ardent love, a Mexi-
can native in the court of the Spanish viceroys, a scholarly and intellectual
woman in a world dominated by men. In the verses cited at the epigraph to
this work, Sor Juana appeals to the son of the viceroy of New Spain, in his
first birthday, to pardon a man about to go to the gallows. The boy, though
less than a year old, was already lavishly covered by titles and riches; yet, as
the nun bravely pointed out, anyone could take life – even a one-year-old
baby – but only God, who came to the world himself as a fragile baby in a
manger, could give life. Pardon was able to encapsulate these contrasts and
make alike the rich and the poor babies, king and God, the doomed and
the powerful, by allowing them to spare the life of a helpless man.
Regardless of the stimulating theological and artistic dimensions of
mercy, my interest here will be on its legal features. Yet, even in law, royal
pardon is a compound of opposites. I am referring to its dubious nature as
both a feature of criminal and constitutional law. Pardon, as the suspen-
sion of punishment, obviously lies in the field of criminal law. Previous
studies, referring to multiple times and jurisdictions, showed how pardon
can introduce new attenuating circumstances1, help to cope with habits
of private negotiation2, take into consideration social norms and moral3,
ease prison management4, pave the way for the creation of parole5, among
several other connections with state punishment. However, pardon has
also an important constitutional value: it showed the magnanimity of the
ruler6, it was a valuable tool for the administration of revolts7, it could de-
liver transitional justice8 and rendered the executive branch able to bypass
legislative inaction9. After all, royal clemency is a display of discretionary
power that is problematic even today10.
1 ALESSI, 2007, p. 93; GRUPP, 1963.
2 BELLABARBA, 1999.
3 STRANGE, 2010.
4 STRANGE, 2016.
5 KOTKAS, 2007; STRONATI, 2009; STRANGE, 2016.
6 GAUVARD, 1995; 2011.
7 DORRIS, 1928; HARVEY, 1965; LUGO, 2015; SCHEUTZ, 2011; SNYDER, 1971.
8 NUBOLA, 2011; FOCARDI, 2011.
9 Especially for the abolition of death penalty (STRONATI, 2009; DE BROUWER, 2009; RI-
BEIRO, 2005).
10 SERRAINO, 2019.
The mild weapon of the crown: making the constitutional value of pardon with public
opinion and the interference of the moderating power over the judiciary
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