The Role of the Judicial Branch in Brazilian Rule of Law Erosion
| Autor | Eneida Desiree Salgado - Emerson Gabardo |
| Cargo | Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the Federal University of Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil) - Full Professor of Administrative Law at the Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil) |
| Páginas | 731-769 |
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 731-769, set./dez. 2021.
The Role of the Judicial Branch in Brazilian Rule of Law Erosion*
O papel do Poder Judiciário na erosão do Estado de Direito brasileiro
ENEIDA DESIREE SALGADO II, **
II Universidade Federal do Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil)
desisalg@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0573-5033
EMERSON GABARDO I, II, ***
I Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil)
II Universidade Federal do Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil)
emerson.gabardo.br@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1798-526X
Recebido/Received: 23.11.2020 / November 23rd, 2020
Aprovado/Approved: 22.07.2021 / July 22nd, 2021
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v8i3.83336
731
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: SALGADO, Eneida Desiree; GABARDO, Emerson. The role of the Judicial Branch
in Brazilian rule of law erosion. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 731-769, set./dez. 2021.
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v8i3.83336.
* This study was nanced by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES/PRINT) – Fi-
nance Code 001.
** Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the Federal University of Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil). Ph.D. in Public Law from
the Federal University of Paraná. Visiting Scholar at the University of California – Irvine/USA (2020). E-mail: desisalg@gmail.com.
*** Full Professor of Administrative Law at the Pontical Catholic University of Paraná (Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil). Associate Professor
of Administrative Law at the Federal University of Paraná (Brazil). Ph.D. in Public Law from the Federal University of Paraná. Visi-
ting Scholar at Fordham University School of Law – NYC/USA (2013) and Visiting Scholar at the University of California – Irvine/
USA (2020). E-mail: emerson.gabardo.br@gmail.com.
Abstract
The rule of law is the central milestone of modern dem-
ocratic states. There is a gap, however, between what is
on the constitutional texts and the lived-in world. The
scholars use to concentrate their focus on the Executive
Branch’s role (and, sometimes, of Legislative Power) in
situations of disregard of the Constitution. However,
we chose to target the Judicial Branch and its decisions
as contributions to the erosion of the rule of law and
the production of democratic decay. We claim that the
Resumo
O Estado de Direito é o marco central dos Estados demo-
cráticos modernos. Há uma lacuna, entretanto, entre o que
está nos textos constitucionais e o mundo vivido. Os estu-
diosos costumam concentrar seu foco no papel do Poder
Executivo (e, às vezes, do Poder Legislativo) em situações
de desrespeito à Constituição. No entanto, o artigo opta
por focar o Poder Judiciário e suas decisões como contri-
buição para a erosão do Estado de Direito brasileiro e para
a produção de decadência democrática. Arma-se que o
ENEIDA DESIREE SALGADO | EMERSON GABARDO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 731-769, set./dez. 2021.
732
CONTENTS
1. Introduction: shreds of populist evidence on Brazilian Judicial Branch; 2. The Brazilian context: ex-
ception, lawfare, and democratic decay; 3. Rule of law erosion and the Brazilian Judiciary; 4. The illiberal
backlash and the return toward an authoritarian perspective; 5. Against the traditional concept of the
rule of law: a judicial new perspective; 6. Conclusion; 7. References.
1. INTRODUCTION: SHREDS OF POPULIST EVIDENCE ON BRAZI
LIAN JUDICIAL BRANCH
Usually seen for the constitutional theory as “the least dangerous branch”,1 the
Judicial Branch in Brazil is threatening democratic constitutionalism by ignoring the
constitutional text and substituting constitutional rules by personal conceptions of
moral and justice. The superior courts’ action rewrites the Constitution, giving more
power to judges and fewer prerogatives for the elective branches, unbalancing the sys-
tem. Claiming to truly represent the people’s will and waiting for popular applause,
justices and judges use populist grammar to justify their decisions.
1 BICKEL, Alexander. The least dangerous branch: The Supreme Court at the bar of politics. New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962.
Judiciary started to play a crucial role in this process by
assuming a populist bias and carrying out common law-
fare practices – which can be well exemplied by judicial
electoral decisions and the judicial decisions about Oper-
ation Car Wash. For researching the problem and discuss-
ing the hypothesis, we used the theoretical-deductive
method. We carried out a literature review. We also use
informative documentaries extracted from the media on
the behavior of public authorities and the critical descrip-
tion of judicial decisions. The bibliography is interdisci-
plinary. We conclude that when the Judicial Branch be-
comes a political actor, it fosters a situation of instability
and becomes an institution whose legitimacy depends
on variations in the mood of society – which goes against
the assumptions of democracy and the rule of law. This
new judicial behavior causes an imbalance between the
powers and the absence of an institution that moderates
social conicts. This situation contributed to the resur-
gence of the authoritarian identity of Brazilian civil so-
ciety and the ideological polarization that culminated in
the election of a far-right administration in 2018.
Keywords: Judicial Branch; democratic decay; lawfare;
Brazilian democracy; Brazilian rule of law erosion.
Judiciário passou a ter papel fundamental nesse processo
ao assumir um viés populista e realizar práticas de lawfa-
re – o que pode ser bem exemplicado pelas decisões judi-
ciais eleitorais e pelas decisões judiciais sobre a Operação
Lava Jato. Para pesquisar o problema e discutir a hipótese,
utilizou-se o método teórico-dedutivo. Foi realizada uma
revisão da literatura acadêmica sobre o assunto e também
em um documentário informativo extraído da mídia sobre
o comportamento do poder público, além da descrição
crítico-exemplicativa de decisões judiciais. O referencial
bibliográco é interdisciplinar. A conclusão assevera que,
ao se tornar ator político, o Poder Judiciário fomenta uma
situação de instabilidade e passa a ser uma instituição cuja
legitimidade depende de variações no estado de espírito da
sociedade – o que contraria os pressupostos da democracia
e do Estado de Direito. Este novo comportamento judicial
provoca um desequilíbrio entre os poderes e a ausência
de uma instituição moderadora dos conitos sociais. Essa
situação contribuiu para o ressurgimento da identidade au-
toritária da sociedade civil brasileira e para a polarização
ideológica que culminou com a eleição de um governo de
extrema direita em 2018.
Palavras-chave: Poder Judiciário; decadência democrá-
tica; lawfare; democracia brasileira; erosão do Estado de
Direito.
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 731-769, set./dez. 2021. 733
The Role of the Judicial Branch in Brazilian Rule of Law Erosion
The Superior Electoral Court establishes rules for the elections, despite the lack
of normative constitutional competence. This activity undermines fundamental rights.
And so it was in the invention of a hypothesis of loss of parliamentary mandate by
abandoning the party for which the representative was elected.2 In the name of a fairer
and more authentic representation, “and, above all, moral reasons”, the Superior Elec-
toral Court ignored the constituent debates that expressly refused to incorporate the
hypothesis in the congresspeople’s constitutional statute.
In a more recent decision, using reasoning based on abstract principles and
statistics, the Superior Electoral Court decided that the political parties share public
money proportionally considering the candidates’ race a few months before the elec-
tions. The decision brings no objective grounds for dividing the fund, and it postponed
the new made-up obligation to 2022.3 However, the Supreme Federal Court, decided,
after the parties’ resolutions about the fund division, that structural racism demands an
urgent answer, creating a rule over the constitutional autonomy of political parties and
the Political Parties Act.4
The fundamental rights were also the object of the judicial populist approach.
Claiming the urge for ethics in politics and an obscure fundamental right of the society
to be protected from bad candidates, the Electoral Court decided to immediately apply
the Clean Record Law, disrespecting the constitutional principle of electoral anterior-
ity and the non-retroactivity of fundamental rights restrictions.5 That does not mean
that judges always act contrary to fundamental rights. In Brazil, the rst two decades of
the 20th century demonstrate a very signicant advance in some rights of vulnerable
groups (such as the LGBTQIA+ population) through the Judiciary. However, the issue
resides precisely in the absence of a rational criterion that determines which rights
will be preserved and which will not be. To some extent, giving themselves the power
to decide about these rights is a way of manifestation of the populist phenomenon.
A phenomenon that is not only Brazilian and that aects both domestic and interna-
tional law.6 But in Brazil, the examples of dysfunctional performance by Public Author-
ities have been very eloquent. And the Judicial Branch cannot be immune to a critical
approach.
2 BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Consulta n. 1398. Relator Ministro Cesar Asfor Rocha. Decisão em 27 de
março de 2007. BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Resolução n. 22610/2007. Relator Ministro Cezar Peluso.
Decisão em 25 de outubro de 2007.
3 BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Consulta n. 060030647. Relator Ministro Luiz Roberto Barroso. Decisão
em 25 de agosto de 2020.
4 BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Medida Cautelar na Ação de Descumprimento de Preceito Funda-
mental n. 738. Relator Ministro Ricardo Lewandowski. Decisão em 05 de outubro de 2020.
5 BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Agravo Regimental no Recurso Ordinário n. 906-78.2010.6.02.0000.
Relator Ministro Hamilton Carvalhido. Decisão em 25 de agosto de 2020.
6 LIXINSKI, Lucas; MOROSINI, Fabio. Populism and International Law: Global South Perspectives. Revista de
Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 17, n. 2, p. 55-65, 2020.
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