The unbundled union politics without collective bargaining
| Autor | Benjamin I. Sachs |
| Páginas | 16-67 |
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THE UNBUNDLED UNION: politics without collective bargaining1
O SINDICATO ABERTO: política sem negociação coletiva
Benjamin I. Sachs 2
ABSTRACT. Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional
response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized,
however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open
to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations
is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most
important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor un ion has been the central vehicle for
this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions
bundle political organization with collective bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a
result, opposition to collective bargaining impedes un ions’ ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for
lowerand middle-income groups.
This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically
through the union form without also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes. Doing so would
have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of collective
bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that
would be necessary to enable such unbundled “political unions” to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the
union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income
groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.
RESUMO: A política pública nos Estados Unidos é desproporcionalmente responsiva aos ricos, e a resposta
tradicional a esse problema, a regulamentação das finanças de campanha, fracassou. Como os estudantes da
política há muito reconhecem, no entanto, a influência política flui não apenas da riqueza, mas também da
organização, uma forma de poder político aberto a todos os grupos de renda. Consequentemente, como este Ensaio
argumenta, uma alternativa promissora aos regulamentos de financiamento de campanha são as intervenções legais
destinadas a facilitar a organização política pelos pobres e pela classe média. Até o momento, a mais importante
intervenção legal desse tipo tem sido a lei trabalhista, e o sindicato tem sido o veículo central para esse tipo de
organização. Mas o sindicato como veículo político-organizacional sofre uma falha fundamental: os sindicatos
agrupam a organização política com a negociação coletiva, uma forma altamente disputada de organização
econômica. Como resultado, a oposição à negociação coletiva impede a capacidade dos sindicatos de servir como
veículo de organização política para grupos de renda baixa e média.
Este Ensaio propõe que o direito trabalhista separa o sindicato, permitindo que os funcionários se
organizem politicamente através da forma sindical sem também se organizarem economicamente para fins de
negociação coletiva. Isso teria o efeito imediato de liberar os esforços político-organizacionais das restrições da
negociação coletiva, um resultado que poderia mitigar a desigualdade re presentacional. O Ensaio identifica as
reformas legais que seriam necessárias para permitir que essas “uniões políticas” abertas tivessem sucesso. Conclui
olhando para além do contexto do sindicato e sugerindo um regime mais amplo de reformas destinadas a facilitar
a organização política por grupos de renda para os quais a desigualdade representacional é agora um problema.
Artigo recebido em 08/09/2018.
Artigo aprovado em 29/09/2018 e 09/10/2018.
1 The author thanks David Barron, Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Gerald Frug, Jack Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson,
and Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments and discussion. The author is also grateful to the participants in
the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop. Nikolas Bowie, William Dreher, Anna Lvovsky, Joshua Segal, and
Heather Whitney provided outstanding research assistance.
2 Benjamin I. Sachs é Professor de Direito do Trabalho na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Harvard.
RDRST, Brasília, Volume IV, n. 02, 2018, p 16-67, Mai-Ago/2018
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction; 2. representational inequality; A. Income and Responsiveness; B. Addressing the
Problem: From Finance to Organization; 3. Unions and representational inequality; A. Unions and Politics; B.
Organizing Through Work; C. Collective Bargaining and Union Decline. 4. The unbundled union: liberating
politics from collective bargaining; A. Improving Prospects for Organizing: Diminishing and AlteringManagerial
Opposition; B. Political Organizing Without Collective Bargaining? 5. Law and organizing: designing an
unbundled regime; 6. beyond the workplace. 7. Conclusion.
SUMÁRIO: 1. Introdução; 2. Desigualdade representacional; A. Renda e Responsividade; B. Lidando com o
problema: das finanças à organização; 3. Uniões e desigualdade representacional; A. Sindicatos e Política; B.
Organizando Através do Trabalho; C. Negociação Coletiva e Declínio Sindical. 4. O sindicato aberto: liberando
a política da negociação coletiva; A. Melhorando as Perspectivas de Organização: Diminuindo e Alterando a
Oposição Gerencial; B. Organização Política sem Negociação Coletiva? 5. Lei e organização: concepção de um
regime aberto; 6. Além do local de trabalho. 7. Conclusão.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is a good time to be wealthy in America and a tough time not to be. This is true not
only because of the well-known economic problems facing low- and middle-income
Americans. It is true because the poor and middle class have a major political problem today.
The problem is that the government is strikingly unresponsive to their views.3 As Martin Gilens
concludes in his study of contemporary American politics, “the preferences of the vast majority
of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or
doesn’t adopt.”4
No government, of course, is perfectly responsive to its citizenry, and perfect
responsiveness is not even an aspiration of our democratic order.5 But it remains a fundamental
democratic commitment that policies enacted by the government reflect the preferences of the
polity. To borrow Dahl’s formulation, “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political
equals.”6 The degree of representational inequality that currently defines American political
practice is thus a matter of substantial concern.
3 See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age (2008); Martin
Gilens, affluence and influence: economic inequality and political power in America (2012); Jacob s. Hacker &
Paul Pierson, Winner- take-all politics: How Washington made the rich richer—and turned its back on the middle
class (2010); Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba & Henry E. Brady, the unheavenly chorus: unequal political
voice and the broken promise of American democracy (2012).
4 GILENS, supra note 1, at 1; see also BARTELS, supra note 1, at 275 (“[L]ow-income citizens as a group seem
to be getting no representation . . . .”); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 599 (concluding that “inequalities
of political voice characterize American politics”).
5 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution,
123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009).
6 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).
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The wealthy have disproportionate influence over public policy because, to state the obvious,
they have more money.7 Because it is the wealthy who make campaign contributions, fund
independent electoral expenditures, and pay for lobbyists, policy is more responsive to those
with money than to those without it.8
Given the political influence that wealth bestows, scholars and Congress have
understandably focused political reform proposals on campaign finance.9 But these attempts to
get money out of politics have devolved into a cat-and- mouse game in which political actors
bent on avoiding regulation, and a Supreme Court bent on invalidating it, have rendered the
reforms ineffectual.10 After all, the Court has now struck down all forms of independent
expenditure limitations, and political actors have designed ways to frustrate even the most
creative restraints on campaign spending.11
Fortunately, however, money is not the only source of influence in American politics.
Political power also flows from political organization, and organization is a source of power
available to all income groups.12 As this Essay will suggest, legal interventions designed to
facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class are thus a viable alternative to
campaign finance reforms and a promising means of redressing representational inequality.
7 As discussed below, both Bartels and Gilens consider and refute the argument that the wealthy’s disproportionate
influence over policy stems from some other variable like higher levels of political participation. See infra text
accompanying notes 53-55.
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); see also GILENS, supra note 1, at 10 (arguing that money “is the root of
representational inequality”).
9 Some notable exceptions include Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
135 (1999); Emma Greenman, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to
Campaign Finance Reform in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L. & POL. 209 (2008); and Bertrall L. Ross
II & Terry Smith, Minimum Responsiveness and the Political Exclusion of the Poor, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 197 (2009).
10 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1705 (1999). Michael Kang uses the “cat-and-mouse” metaphor as well. Michael S. Kang, The End of
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2012). Heather Gerken describes campaign finance reform efforts
as “the regulatory equivalent of whack-a- mole.” Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New
Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2011). As discussed below, some campaign finance
scholars are abandoning strategies that focus on campaign finance and advocating lobbying reform. See, e.g.,
Gerken, supra; Kang, supra. This Essay shares the view that more or better campaign finance regulation is not the
solution to what ails our politics, but it proposes a different approach for moving forward. See infra Part III.
11 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 125 & n.38 (2010); LESSIG,
supra note 6, at 271 (admitting his proposal’s “Achilles’ heel” lies in the possibility for independent expenditures).
12 See GILENS, supra note 1, at 7 (describing interest groups as a “parallel channel of influence over government
policy”). Walter Korpi offers an early and influential account of the importance of collective political organization
for lower- and middle-class citizens. WALTER KORPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE 26 (1983)
(“[T]he major power resources of the wage-earners are their organizations for collective action.”); see also Nathan
J. Kelly, Political Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 865, 867 (2005)
(“[T]he lower classes must organize in order for their collective voice to be heard and influence outcomes.”).
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