Uma Defesa Ciceroniana de Participação Democrática

AutorXinzhi Zhao
Páginas103-129
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-7984.2021.e78929
103103 – 129
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A Ciceronian Defense of
Democratic Participation1-2
Xinzhi Zhao
Abstract
Opposing the usual elitist presentation of Cicero, I identify three arguments favoring democratic
participation in De re publica and De legibus. The rst sees democratic participation as a demand
of the common people, which results from their untamable desire for freedom and must be
fullled to avoid civil unrest. The second sees it as an instrument to lessen the likelihood of
elites’ corruption. The third incorporates the previous two under an account of state legitimacy,
arguing that democratic participation is just because without it, the civic community under a
state’s rule cannot be a partnership and hence the state cannot be a legitimate one as a common
property of the people. I argue that this account of state legitimacy differs from the one in Pettit’s
republicanism and may help clarify the normative commitment to the public nature of the state
that underlies the current “realist” and “instrumental” defenses of democracy.
Keywords: Cicero, Pettit, Republican freedom, Democratic participation, State legitimacy
1 Introduction: Cicero and the Role of Democratic
Participation in Republican Government
Republicanism is one of the most important developments in
contemporary political theory. Advocates of republicanism have argued
that it can inform and enrich democratic political theory and practice.
1 I want to thank Daniel Kapust for his helpful comments on the earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to
express my appreciation for the anonymous reviewer’s careful reading of my manuscript, constructive feedback,
and useful suggestions for additional literature, which helped improve the manuscript.
2 The following abbreviations are used to denote the dialogues by Cicero cited in this paper: Rep. = De re publica
(English translation: On the Republic, or On the State), Leg. = De legibus (English Translation: On the Laws), De
or. = De Oratore (English translation: On the Ideal Orator).
A Ciceronian Defense of Democratic Participation
104 103 – 129
In Republicanism (1997), the major work that reformulates the historical
republican tradition and lays the theoretical foundation for contemporary
republicanism, Philip Pettit (1997, p. 183-200) argues that democratic
participation in the form of eective “contestation” against the results and
procedures of governmental decision-making is the necessary instrument
to fulll the republican freedom as non-domination. In On the Peoples
Terms (2012), Pettit renes his theory of “contestatory democracy”
by incorporating it into a republican theory of political legitimacy. He
identies the legitimacy of a state as the presence of an “individualized”,
“unconditioned”, and “ecacious” system of “popular control” (PETTIT,
2012, p. 167) over the state’s imposition of a social order and thus a “robust
absence” of domination in the relationship between citizens and their state
(PETTIT, 2012, p. 24).
While his works represent the most philosophically rigorous
articulation of contemporary republicanism, Pettit sees (2012, p. 19)
his theory as building on a republican tradition that he traces back to
the ideas and practices of the Roman Republic. More specically, Pettit
(2012, p. 5-6) frames his theory as the modern update of the “three core
ideas” – “freedom as non-domination, the mixed constitution and the
contestatory citizenry” – that he identies in the beginning of the historical
republican tradition in the Roman Republic. Yet can we really nd a rm
defense of democratic participation in the political thought of the Roman
Republic? If we can, does this ancient defense of democratic participation
bear any concrete resemblance to what claims to be its modern echoes in
contemporary republicanism? If there is a dierence between the ancient
defense and the modern one, does this dierence have any relevance to the
theory and practice of democracy in the 21st century?
As the foremost Roman political philosopher of the Republic,
Marcus Tullius Cicero stands at the beginning of Pettit’s genealogy of the
republican tradition (PETTIT, 1997, p. 5, 284, 2012, p. 6). Yet in studies
of Roman political thought, Cicero is far from being seen as an unequivocal
advocate for encompassing the voice of plebeians or the common people
in the governance of a true republic. Given his own wealthy background
and his opposition to the poor’s demands for land distribution in the
turmoil of the late Republic, Cicero has often been depicted as “a Roman

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