Human dignity in the moral discourse of social justice for people with severe or extreme mental disabilities
| Autor | Ana Paula Barbosa-Fohrmann |
| Ocupação do Autor | Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro |
| Páginas | 1712-1732 |
1712 • XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Human dignity in the moral discourse
of social justice for people with severe
or extreme mental disabilities
Ana Paula Barbosa-Fohrmann1
Abstract As a departing point for this paper three dierent positions were
identieda liberalone whichdefends autonomyand independencea second
one, which is grounded on dependence and vulnerability and a third one, which
lays emphasis on human capabilities. None of them, however, includes people
with mental disabilities. In this paper, we will therefore analyse whether Kant’s
moral philosophy represents – in opposition to these three positions – an in-
clusivetheoryAccordingto theGrundlegung derMetaphysik derSienau-
tonomy is the capacity to accept freely and with self-determination moral laws
and to obey them. By providing himself with laws based on reason, man is
endowed with absolute value, and this is what constitutes his dignity. There-
fore, autonomy is the basis for the dignity of human being and of every rational
human nature. Furthermore, human dignity grounded on the absolute value
of man presupposes that he is an end in himself. As an absolute end in himself
every rational being shall therefore admit that everyone else equally is. Thus,
reason, autonomy, equality and dignity form a relation based on motives. This
paper will discuss if this discourse on human dignity also includes people with
severe or extreme mental disabilities, i.e., if it regards them not only as men, but
also as moral persons. Based on the assertion that human dignity is inherent to
a rational human nature this paper will demonstrate that every man with no
exception has human dignity. Therefore, all people with severe or extreme men-
tal disabilities can be considered “men” in Kantian sense, and to that extent,
they are endowed with dignity. However, this paper will tackle another intricate
question: if the human dignity of people with severe or extreme mental impair-
ments enables them to be regarded as “men” in Kantian sense, can they also be
included in the Kantian conception of moral person?
Keywords: Autonomy. Dignity. People with Severe or Extreme Mental Dis-
abilities.
1
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.. E-mail: ap_cbarbosa@yahoo.de.
Working Group: Human Rights • 1713
I. Introduction
According to several philosophers, the conception of “person”
isuntiltoday oneofthemostdicultissuesinthemodernmoralphi-
losophyegQUANTEandSCHWEIKARD p WOOD
1998, p. 172). Taking the confusion that dominates the research literature
concerning the conceptions of “moral person” and “human being” as
a starting point, we will examine these two conceptions grounded on
KantsGrundlegungderMetaphysikderSienForthiswewillusethe
group of people with mental disabilities, in particular those with severe
or extreme mental impairments as case study. If they can be understood
to be embraced by the Kantian moral conception of person, they conse-
quently have self-legislative capacity to respect the moral law and to act
havingitasasolesucientmotiveoftheirwillTheyarehenceprovid-
ed with autonomy and subsequently with dignity. In order to establish
thedierentiationsbetweenhuman being and moral person and
also to respond to the question whether people with severe or extreme
mental disabilities are endowed with autonomy and dignity we propose
asadepartingpointinthispapertoanalysethreedierenttheoretical
positions on social justice for people disabilities and 2) to present some
criticism on those theories. Subsequently, we introduce 3) some concep-
tual interpretations of Kantian autonomy as well as 4) an alternative in-
terpretationofdignitybasedon Asa nalpointwepropose the
application of (3) and (4) to some cases of people with severe or extreme
mental disabilities.
II. The Current State of the Issue
1. Procedural Justice
1.1. John Rawls
The starting point of the discussion on social justice for people
with mental impairments is the thesis developed by Rawls, which aims
to found a universal and inclusive theory of justice (RAWLS, 1971, 1993,
p. 5-6). In Rawls all individuals with no exception are initially under a
so-called “veil of ignorance or unawareness” (KOLLER, 1996, p. 371),
in which the contracting parties stripped of individualizing characteris-
tics choose the foundational principles of justice for the political society.
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