Neoliberal hegemony versus social Justice
| Autor | Natalia Pais Álvarez |
| Ocupação do Autor | University of La Laguna (ULL), Spain |
| Páginas | 2811-2826 |
Working Group: Justice and public policies • 2811
Neoliberal hegemony versus social Justice
Natalia Pais Álvarez, PhD1
Abstract: Itispossiblethatthehegemonyconstitutesthenishedshapethe
closing of the rational paradigm in the 20th century, and that from it we have
met doomed to this period of disturbances, chaos, uncertainty, a sort of tedi-
um. Already we cannot think the power from the old devices with which the
privileged classes or the capital perpetuated its domination. The analyses that
wereuncoveringthealienationtheoppressionandthemysticationXIXand
XXth and were giving content to the dialectical draft owner slavewould
nishwith therelationalready theydonot serveus the questionisthat the
destruction of the social links based on the domain already has taken place: it has
been realized technically by means of the virtual emancipation (generalization
of the exchange, reconciliation of opposite with the assumption of the Human
rightsThepositionoftheownerisinternalizedonthepartoftheemancipat-
ed slave and there is solved quite in a paradox that, according to Baudrillard, he
supposesthetotalliberationtheresolutionoftheconictsandthefreedisposi-
tionofoneitselftheyhaveledustosubmiingustotheworldhegemonicorder
Keywords: neoliberal hegemony, oppression, Justice
“It is a world in which the experienced
events have become independent of the man (...)
It is a world of the future, the world
of what happens without that happening to anyone,
and no one is responsible.”
(Bouvresse)
Talking about a concept like hegemony in a time marked by the
discourseofthescientictechnicalperformativityatthemarketservice
involves the risk that it could be read as an infertile abstraction against a
conspirator and invisible faceless entity.
1
University of La Laguna (ULL), Spain.
2812 • XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Precisely for this reason, what concerns us here is reveal them
in the pursuit of the substrate of discourses and alternative/alterative
practices to help overcome the historical conditions that have made it
possible in the neoliberal and triumphant order on the capitalist world-
system stage.
Antonio Gramsci had already established the distinction be-
tween domination and hegemony, so the domain would be crossed by a
political dimension, which, in times of crisis can get to make use of coer-
cion, while hegemony refers to an ideological-cultural and non coercive
dimension, although it also involved political and social forces.
Gramsci will consider the need to traverse economist dimension
of hegemony and gives great weight to ideology, that it will be a privi-
lege engine to rethink policy as an authentic redemptive strategy for the
conformation of social transformation subjectivities.
Theconnotationof dominationof prominenceverticalcuing
is clear and the objective of socialism exposed is governed by antag-
onism. The “normal” execution of hegemony in what has become the
classiceldofparliamentaryregimeischaracterizedbyabalancedcom-
bination of strength and consensus. Strength does not overcome, but
appears to be supported by the consensus of the majority, expressed by
the so called organs of public opinion (which therefore, on certain occa-
sionsarearticiallyincreased
Between consensus and strength, is the corruption-fraud (which
ischaracteristic of certainsituationswhich make itdicult to execute
hegemony, in which the use of strength presents too many dangers). In
other words, Gramsci purports that corruption-fraud provokes weak-
ness and paralysis in the antagonists (123-124).
Hegemonyasleadership arisesasaninuencenot asdomina-
tion, to the extent that is not imposed by force. It also posits the impos-
sibility of a social order derivative of an absolute consensus. The domi-
nance results in an imposition by force of a political-economic and social
order, while hegemony, however, arises from the formula of consensus,
although the strength can be used at times when it is impossible to reach
it.
Now, it is not participatory and decisive consensus but, there-
in the problem lies, is considered democratic only insofar as it implies
the absence of authoritarianism. And this returns not only dangerous
reading of the concept of democracy, but that challenges Fukuyama’s
proclamation that we are witnessing the end of last metanarrative: the
nalConsensusabsoluteorderabsenceofconictorvirtualempireof
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