Beyond Invalidation: Unorthodox Forms of Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and Constitution-amending Case Law in Colombia
| Autor | Vicente F. Benítez-R. |
| Cargo | Professor of Comparative and Constitutional Law at the Law School and Political Sciences of Universidad de La Sabana (Chía, Colombia) |
| Páginas | 269-300 |
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 9, n. 2, p. 269-300, maio/ago. 2022.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v9i2.86742
269
Beyond Invalidation: Unorthodox Forms of Judicial
Review of Constitutional Amendments and
Constitution-amending Case Law in Colombia
Além da invalidação: formas não ortodoxas de controle
de constitucionalidade de reformas constitucionais
e jurisprudência reformadora na Colômbia
VICENTE F. BENÍTEZROJAS I, *
I Universidad de La Sabana (Chía, Colombia)
vicente.benitez@unisabana.edu.co
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1278-4634
Recebido/Received: 13.07.2022/ July 13th, 2022
Aprovado/Approved: 28.08.2022/ August 28th, 2022
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: BENÍTEZ-ROJAS, Vicente F. Beyond Invalidation: Unorthodox Forms of Judicial
Review of Constitutional Amendments and Constitution-amending Case Law in Colombia. Revista de Investigações Consti-
tucionais, Curitiba, vol. 9, n. 2, p. 269-300, maio/ago. 2022. DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v9i2.86742
* Professor of Comparative and Constitutional Law at the Law School and Political Sciences of Universidad de La Sabana (Chía,
Colombia). J.S.D., New York University School of Law.E-mail: vicente.benitez@unisabana.edu.co
Abstract
Judicial invalidation of constitutional amendments has
garnered the attention of scholars in the last few years.
Questions like whether and how a court should quash an
amendment are at the forefront of contemporary com-
parative-constitutional-law and constitutional-theory in-
quiries. This excessive focus on annulment, however, has
neglected some other nonconventional forms of judicial
involvement regarding amendments. Taking Colombia
as a case study, this article shows that the Constitutional
Court has also had the power to initiate amendments,
dene their content, rewrite their text, and promulgate
them. As these novel judicial interventions that go be-
yond invalidation resemble the prerogatives commonly
vested on the amendment power, this research terms
them ‘constitution-amending case law’, oers an in-
depth exploration of them, and proposes a typology
of such a jurisprudence. Lastly, the article ends with a
Resumo
A invalidação judicial de reformas constitucionais tem
despertado a atenção de estudiosos nos últimos anos.
Questões tais quais, ‘se’ e ‘como’ um tribunal deve anular
uma reforma, estão na vanguarda das investigações con-
temporâneas de direito constitucional comparado e teoria
constitucional. Esse foco excessivo na anulação, no entanto,
negligenciou algumas outras formas não convencionais de
envolvimento judicial em relação às reformas. Tomando
a Colômbia como estudo de caso, este artigo mostra que
o Tribunal Constitucional também teve o poder de iniciar
reformas, denir seu conteúdo, reescrever seu texto e pro-
mulgá-las. Como essas novas intervenções judiciais que
vão além da invalidação se assemelham às prerrogativas
comumente conferidas ao poder de reforma, esta pesquisa
as denomina “jurisprudência reformadora”, oferece uma
exploração aprofundada delas e propõe uma tipologia
de tal jurisprudência. Por m, o artigo termina com uma
VICENTE F. BENÍTEZROJAS
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 9, n. 2, p. 269-300, maio/ago. 2022.
270
cautionary note about the challenges this type of consti-
tution-amending case law faces from the perspective of
democracy and democratic backsliding.
Keywords: judicial review; constitutional amendments;
unorthodox judicial review; Colombian Constitutional
Court; democracy.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction; 2. The Standard Judicial Role in Amendment Processes: A Fixation on Amendment In-
validation; 3. Non-traditional Judicial Interventions in Colombia; 4. Concluding Remarks; 5. References.
1. INTRODUCTION
An important strand of contemporary comparative constitutional law and cons-
titutional theory has focused its attention on the study of the limitations that can be
imposed on the power to amend constitutions, the possibility of an unconstitutional
constitutional amendment, and the judicial enforcement of such limitations.1 One of
the main points of interest of this literature has to do with the promises and perils ju-
dicial scrutiny might bring about when an amendment is invalidated. While a court
like the Colombian Constitutional Court (hereinafter CCC) is almost globally praised
for having prevented former president Uribe from running for a third term in oce by
quashing an amendment granting such a possibility,2 some other tribunals such as the
1
The literature is too vast to mention here. However, the two leading texts on the matter are ALBERT, Ri-
chard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. 1. Ed. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2019; and ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of
Amendment Powers. 1. Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. From a global perspective, see also DIXON,
Rosalind and LANDAU, David. Transnational constitutionalism and a limited doctrine of unconstitutional cons-
titutional amendment. International Journal of Constitutional Law, I-CON, Oxford, vol. 13, n. 3, p. 606-638,
Jul./Oct. 2015. An interesting presentation of the limits on the amendment power in Latin America can be seen
in ROZNAI, Yaniv. Constitutional Unamendability in Latin America Gone Wrong? In: ALBERT, Richard; BERNAL,
Carlos and BENVINDO, Juliano Zaiden (Eds.). Constitutional Change and Transformation in Latin America.
1. Ed. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019, p. 93-116. The case of Colombia is studied by BERNAL, Carlos. Unconstitu-
tional constitutional amendments in the case study of Colombia: An analysis of the justication and meaning
of the constitutional replacement doctrine. International Journal of Constitutional Law, I-CON, Oxford, vol.
11, n. 2, p. 339-357, Apr./Jul. 2013; CAJAS-SARRIA, Mario. Lessons from the history of courts on the review of
constitutional amendments in Colombia. In: TATE, Joshua C.; DE LIMA LOPES, José Reinaldo and BOTERO-BER-
NAL, Andrés (Eds.). Global Legal History. A Comparative Law Perspective. 1. Ed. London: Routledge, 2019,
p. 87-105; GARCÍA-JARAMILLO, Santiago and GNECCO ESTRADA, Francisco. La teoría de la sustitución: de la
protección de la supremacía e integridad de la constitución, a la aniquilación de la titularidad del poder de
reforma constitucional en el órgano legislativo. Vniversitas, Bogotá, vol. 65, p. 59-104, Jul./Dec. 2016; RAMÍRE-
Z-CLEVES, Gonzalo. Límites de la reforma constitucional en Colombia: El concepto de Constitución como
fundamento de la restricción. 1. Ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2005.
2
See, for instance, ISSACHAROFF, Samuel. Courts as Guarantors of Democracy. In: LINARES, Alejandro, VAL-
DIVIESO, Camilo and GARCÍA, Santiago (Eds.). Constitutionalism. Old Dilemmas, New Insights. 1. Ed. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 131-133. According to Versteeg and her coauthors, the CCC has been the
advertência sobre os desaos que esse tipo de jurisprudên-
cia reformadora enfrenta na perspectiva da democracia e
do retrocesso democrático.
Palavras-chave: controle de constitucionalidade; refor-
mas constitucionais; controle de constitucionalidade hete-
rodoxo; Tribunal Constitucional colombiano; democracia.
Beyond Invalidation: Unorthodox Forms of Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and Constitution-amending Case Law in Colombia
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 9, n. 2, p. 269-300, maio/ago. 2022. 271
Honduran, Nicaraguan, and Bolivian courts are criticized for having used the uncons-
titutional constitutional amendment doctrine in an abusive way to invalidate consti-
tutional prohibitions on presidential re-election and, thus, to entrench the power of
illiberal rulers.3
Although all these studies are certainly relevant as they have allowed us to re-
ne our grasp on the role of the judiciary in constitutional amendment processes, their
approach is wanting. To be more specic, many of these accounts tend to assume that
the only manifestation of judicial review of amendments a judge can develop occurs
when a court strikes a formal amendment down.4 However, the experience of the CCC
shows that judicial involvement with amendments is far from being just a matter of
annulment. The CCC not only has voided several amendments, but also, perhaps in an
unorthodox fashion, has exercised dierent forms of –more assertive– constitutional
oversight of amendments. In several cases, the CCC has rendered decisions by which it
(i) has determined that Congress is obliged to introduce an amendment with the con-
tent the CCC has previously indicated; (ii) has established authoritative interpretations of
certain amendments; (iii) has rewritten constitutional rules and dened what the text
of an amendment should look like; and (iv) has ordered Congress to promulgate an
amendment bill the legislature had already shelved.
In this context, this article advances a twofold argument. First, it holds that there
are neglected and unorthodox paths of judicial review of amendments in Colombia
that could illuminate the ongoing global discussion on the role of judges in relation to
constitutional amendments and proposes a typology of these nonconventional judi-
cial interventions. Secondly, it contends that this nontraditional judicial involvement
strikingly resembles the steps required to pass an amendment in virtually any cons-
titutional democracy and comfortably ts into well-established denitions of what a
constitutional amendment is. Therefore, the article will suggest that this type of case
law –that will be termed ‘constitution-amending jurisprudence’– implies a problematic
replacement of Congress (as the legitimate site of the amending power) by the judicial
branch.
To substantiate these two claims, this document is structured as follows. The
article begins by showing that, when examining the role of judges vis-à-vis amend-
ments, contemporary comparative-law and constitutional-theory scholarship has
only court in the world since the year 2000 that has successfully prevented a chief executive from overstaying
in power. See VERSTEEG, Mila; HORLEY, Timothy; MENG, Anne; GUIM, Mauricio and GUIRGUIS, Marilyn. The Law
and Politics of Presidential Term Limit Evasion. Columbia Law Review, New York, Vol. 120, n. 1, p. 173-248, Jan.
2020. p. 178-9, 217, 231.
3
See LANDAU, David; ROZNAI, Yaniv and DIXON, Rosalind. Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Constitu-
tional Amendment Doctrine Lessons from Latin America. In: BATURO, Alexander and ELGIE, Robert (Eds.). The
Politics of Presidential Term Limits. 1. Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019 p. 53-74.
4
See Subsection 2.2. infra.
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