Constitutional neutrality: an essay on the essential meaning of freedom of speech
| Autor | João dos Passos Martins Neto |
| Cargo | Professor at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (Florianópolis-SC, Brazil). Master's in law and Doctor of Law from the Federal University of Santa Catarina |
| Páginas | 239-265 |
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 6, n. 2, p. 239-265, maio/ago. 2019.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v6i2.62470
239
Constitutional neutrality: an essay on the
essential meaning of freedom of speech
Neutralidade constitucional: um ensaio sobre o
signicado essencial da liberdade de expressão
JOÃO DOS PASSOS MARTINS NETO I, *
I Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Brasil)
passos@pge.sc.gov.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1168-3201
Recebido/Received: 22.10.2018 / October 22th, 2018
Aprovado/Approved: 17.11.2019 / November 17th, 2019
Abstract
The present essay explores the essential meaning of
freedom of speech in the context of contemporary con-
stitutional democracy. In addressing the question of how
free speech constitutional clause should be understood
in an universe full of controversial cases, the study artic-
ulates three main propositions: 1.Freedom of speech is
the right not to be prevented from speaking or not to
be punished for speaking based on the alleged unac-
ceptability of an idea (taken as incorrect, inappropriate,
stupid, irrelevant, shocking, dangerous, etc.); 2. Freedom
of speech grants protection no matter the content of the
message because the exchange of ideas is valuable for
reasons other than the substantive qualities of what is
said; to be worthy of protection, speech does not need to
be infallible, clever or polite, but only play an expressive
role in the process of discussion; 3. Freedom of speech
doesn’t collide with rights of others, especially in the case
Resumo
O presente ensaio explora o signicado essencial da liberda-
de de expressão no contexto da democracia constitucional
contemporânea. Ao abordar a questão de como a cláusula
constitucional da livre expressão deve ser entendida em um
universorepleto de casos controversos, o estudo apresenta
três proposições principais: 1. A liberdade de expressão é o
direito de não ser impedido de falar ou de não ser punido
por falar com base na suposta inaceitabilidade de uma
ideia (tomada como incorreta, inapropriada, estúpida,
irrelevante, chocante, perigosa, etc.); 2. A liberdade de ex-
pressão garante proteção qualquer que seja o conteúdo da
mensagem porque a troca de idéias é valiosa por outras ra-
zões que não as qualidades substantivas do que é dito; para
ser digno de proteção, o discurso não precisa ser infalível, in-
teligente ou polido, mas apenas desempenhar uma função
expressiva no processo de discussão; 3. A liberdade de ex-
pressão não colide com direitos dos outros, especialmente
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: MARTINS NETO, João dos Passos. Constitutional neutrality: an essay on the essential
meaning of freedom of speech. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 6, n. 2, p. 239-265, maio/ago. 2019.
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v6i2.62470.
* Professor at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (Florianópolis-SC, Brazil). Master’s in law and Doctor of Law from the Federal
University of Santa Catarina. Visiting Scholar at the Columbia University in 2007-2008 (New York, NY, United States of America).
Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley in 2018 (Berkeley, CA, United States of America). State Attorney at the Attorney General’s
Oce of the State of Santa Catarina (Florianópolis-SC, Brazil). E-mail: passos@pge.sc.gov.br.
JOÃO DOS PASSOS MARTINS NETO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 6, n. 2, p. 239-265, maio/ago. 2019.
240
CONTENTS
1. Introduction: a critical question; 2. The false cry of re; 3. Speech and expressive value; 4. Free speech
and democracy; 5. Free speech and truth; 6. Free speech and autonomy; 7. Free speech and tolerance;
8. Constitutional neutrality; 9. Free speech and equality; 10. Speech and action; 11. Conclusion: an en-
lightening case; 12. References.
1. INTRODUCTION: A CRITICAL QUESTION
Constitutional democracy is a way of organizing relations between government
and individuals inside national states. It is essentially characterized by the acceptance
of a written or unwritten constitution that performs as a higher law and guarantees
even against governmental powers certain human rights that, according to historical
and rational agreement, people may never be deprived of, such as life, freedom, pro-
perty, equality, due process and vote. Freedom of speech is probably the brightest star
in the constellation of constitutional rights.
In a rst approach, freedom of speech could be dened as a principle accor-
ding to which individuals must have the liberty to hold and express ideas through oral
language and writing, symbolic gestures or images, in any platform and concerning a
variety of matters, from politics to religion, economy to history, without fearing or suf-
fering censorship or punishment. However, despite of what this broad concept might
suggest, freedom of speech is not conceived anywhere as a right that grants protection
to everything that can be uttered. In free speech American legal doctrine, for instance,
it is very well known the famous adage of US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Holmes, who
proclaimed long ago that “the most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting re in a theatre and causing a panic”1. This old sentence
expresses a view that remains as one of the most powerful in free speech thinking and
ruling everywhere: freedom of speech is limited, it does not cover all kinds of speech.
Some crimes committed with the use of language - like threats, slander, false
alarms, harassment, conspiracy or blackmail - are considered unworthy of protection
without contention. It seems they don’t even get to t into a satisfactory concept of
1 Schenck v. United States. Supreme Court of the United States. 249 U.S 47 (1919).
of assertive speech acts, that is, assertions of facts and
values that the speaker sincerely believes to be true or
correct; even when the content sounds outrageous, as-
serting something doesn’t imply violation of anyone’s
right, but rather it means the exercise of one’s own right.
Keywords: constitutional democracy; content neutrality;
freedom of speech; tolerance; equity.
no caso dos atos da fala assertivos, isto é, de asserções de
fatos e valores que o falante acredita que sãoverdadeiras
ou corretas; mesmo quando soe ultrajante, asserir algo não
implica violação de direito alheio, mas signica o exercício
do próprio direito.
Palavras-chave: democracia constitucional; neutralidade
de conteúdo; liberdade de expressão; tolerância; equidade.
Para continuar a ler
PEÇA SUA AVALIAÇÃO