Cortes Constitucionais julgando Sistemas Eleitorais: um olhar comparativo sobre os julgamentos constitucionais a respeito da Igualdade Eleitoral

AutorAndrea Romano
CargoAssistant Professor (Serra Húnter Fellow), University of Barcelona (Barcelona, Spain) and PhD in Law from La Sapienza University of Rome (2014)
Páginas1-32
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 10, n. 2, e232, maio/ago. 2023.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v10i2.89827
1
Constitutional Courts Dealing with Electoral
Systems: a Comparative Look at Constitutional
Adjudication on Electoral Equality
Cortes Constitucionais julgando Sistemas Eleitorais:
um olhar comparativo sobre os julgamentos
constitucionais a respeito da Igualdade Eleitoral
ANDREA ROMANO I, *
I University of Barcelona (Barcelona, Spain)
andrea.romano@ub.edu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0919-7685
Recebido/Received: 17.02.2023 / 17 February 2023
Aprovado/Approved: 26.05.2023 / 26 May 2023
Abstract
The article employs comparative analysis to investigate
the nexus between constitutional adjudication and
electoral systems through the perspective of the prin-
ciple of equality in elections. It delves into the dierent
reasoning of the constitutional courts of Germany, Italy
and Spain, trying to unpack the various interpretations
attached to that principle under the case law of these
courts. In particular, it explores the arguments revolving
around the interpretation of equality as the “one person,
one vote” rule and its potential wider meaning, compar-
ing the approaches adopted in the case law of the three
jurisdictions. On a theoretical level, this submission aims
to provide insights on the functions and limits of consti-
tutional review in electoral matters and, more generally,
Resumo
Este estudo aborda, de forma comparativa, o nexo entre a
jurisdição constitucional e os sistemas eleitorais através da
perspectiva do princípio da igualdade em matéria eleitoral.
Desta maneira, o seu objetivo é examinar as linhas de argu-
mentação dos tribunais constitucionais da Alemanha, Itália
e Espanha, tentando desdobrar as diferentes interpretações
desse princípio sob a jurisprudência dos países menciona-
dos. Em particular, explora os argumentos que giram em
torno da interpretação da igualdade como a regra de “uma
pessoa, um voto” e seu potencial signicado mais amplo,
comparando as abordagens adotadas na jurisprudência
das três jurisdições acima citadas. Em um nível teórico, o
artigo tenta também realçar as funções e limites da revi-
são constitucional em matéria eleitoral e, mais em geral,
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: ROMANO, Andrea. Constitutional Courts Dealing with Electoral Systems: a Com-
parative Look at Constitutional Adjudication on Electoral Equality. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 10,
n. 2, e232, maio/ago. 2023. DOI: 10.5380/rinc.v10i2.89827
* Assistant Professor (Serra Húnter Fellow), University of Barcelona (Barcelona, Spain) and PhD in Law from La Sapienza Univer-
sity of Rome (2014). He has been a postdoctoral researcher in Italy (La Sapienza University of Rome), Switzerland (University of
Fribourg) and Spain (Castilla La Mancha University and Institute for Self-Government Studies). Expert on international protection
with the Italian Ministry of the Interior, EASO and UNHCR. Dr Romano is co-coordinator of the book The External Dimension of
EU Migration and Asylum Policies: Border Management, Human Rights and Development Policies in the Mediterranean Area
(Nomos, 2020), and has published in national and international journals (Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, CIDOB Immi-
gration Yearbook, Diritto pubblico). Since 2016 he is a member of the Observatory of Public Law (IDP) of Barcelona.
ANDREA ROMANO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 10, n. 2, e232, maio/ago. 2023.
2
CONTENTS
1. Introduction; 2. The constitutionalization of electoral matters and the interpretation of voting equa-
lity; 3. The principle of equality and constitutional reality (Verfassungswircklichheit) in the jurisprudence
of the Federal Constitutional Court; 4. Reasonableness and proportionality in the jurisprudence of Italy’s
Constitutional Court; 5. The jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the relevance of
proportional scrutiny; 6. Conclusion; 7. References.
1. INTRODUCTION1
With the evolution of constitutionalism has come the struggle to reduce in-
equality, one of the cornerstones of which is the progressive armation of equal access
to the vote.2 Together with the founding recognition of the equality principle, a com-
mon pattern of contemporary constitutions is, more specically, to include equality in
voting among the constitutional principles informing the holding of elections (infra).
However, the electoral system and the features thereof that are adopted in a given
country may, to varying degrees, increase inequality among voters, as a consequence
of, inter alia, the (un)equal distribution of the population among districts, the existence
of election thresholds or the introduction of a majority bonus. What voting equality
represents under constitutional law and under what conditions the introduction of dis-
tortions of voting equality are consistent with the constitution remains controversial.
Constitutional courts have engaged with this issue across ages and contexts.3 This pa-
per investigates the role that constitutional adjudication has played in electoral matters
in Germany, Italy and Spain, focusing more specically on how the constitutional courts
1 For ease of reading, quotations in German, Italian and Spanish in the main text have been translated by
the author. Quotations in footnotes have been left in the original language, except where an ocial transla-
tion was available.
2 For a political science perspective, see DALTON, Russell J. Political inequality and the democratic process. In:
GIUGNI, Marco; GRASSO, Maria (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Participation. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2022, pp. 912-930. p. 932, quoting Dahl: “in making collective decisions the […] interest of each person
should be given equal consideration. Insuring that the interests of each are given equal consideration, in turn,
requires that every adult member of an association be entitled to participate in making binding and collective
decisions aecting that person’s good or interest. This principle in turn requires political equality”.
3 On the role of Courts on the issue of redistricting see HANDLEY, Lisa. Electoral systems and redistricting.
In HERRON, Erik S.; PEKKANEN, Robert J.; SHUGART, Matthew S. The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 513-532. p. 516.
to contribute to studies of constitutional law concerned
with the tension between legislative discretion and the
role of constitutional courts.
Keywords: equality; electoral law; constitutional juris-
diction; comparative constitutionalism; constitutional
courts.
contribuir para estimular os estudos de direito constitucio-
nal focados em a tensão entre a discricionariedade legisla-
tiva e o papel dos tribunais constitucionais.
Palavras-chave: igualdade; Direito Eleitoral; jurisdi-
ção constitucional; comparação constitucional; cortes
constitucionais.
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 10, n. 2, e232, maio/ago. 2023.
Constitutional Courts Dealing with Electoral Systems: a Comparative Look at Constitutional Adjudication on Electoral Equality
3
of these three countries have interpreted the nexus between the principle of equality
and elections, emphasizing the canons of interpretation that they have adopted to ad-
judicate on the electoral system, i.e., the set of rules determining how votes cast in an
election are translated into parliamentary seats.4
A comparative approach to address this issue is highly relevant, as conrmed
by the “incorporation” of comparative references in the German, Italian and Spanish
constitutional courts’ judgments on electoral matters. Whereas the use of foreign legal
sources or precedents is to varying degrees limited,5 if on the rise, it is interesting to
observe their presence when the Courts deal with electoral legislation, specically on
the subject of electoral equality. In judgment no. 75/1985, the Spanish Constitutional
Court – whose comparative references are rare – referred to the case law of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht on election thresholds. The Federal Constitutional Court was also
quoted in judgment no. 1/2014 (infra) of the Italian Constitutional Court.6 That decision,
as well as judgment no. 35/2017 (infra), also contains references, if vague and implicit,
to comparative law.7 In turn, when the Federal Constitutional Court was called on to
adjudicate on the varying size of electoral districts, it commissioned the Max Planck
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law for an expert opinion and
comparative overview on how the size of electoral districts inuences the equality
4 RAE, Douglas. The political consequences of electoral laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
5 See generally GROPPI, Tania, PONTHOREAU, Marie-Claire (Coords.). The Use of Foreign Precedents by
Constitutional Judges. Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2013, and particularly the Chapter of GROPPI, Tania, PONTHO-
REAU, Marie, Conclusion, p. 411. On Spain see ALEMÁN, Ángel Aday Jiménez. The Spanish Constitutional Court
and Foreign and Comparative Law: Theory and Practice of a Marriage of Convenience. In: FERRARI, Giuseppe
Franco. Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Use of Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems. Leiden:
Brill, pp. 375-401, 2019; ARZOZ SANTISTEBAN, Xabier. La cita de jurisprudencia constitucional comparada por
el Tribunal Constitucional Español. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, vol. 125, may./aug.,
pp. 13-44, 2022, counts 46 decisions for the Spanish Constitutional Court from its inception until 2022. For Italy
see PASSAGLIA, Paolo. L’utilizzo del diritto comparato da parte della Corte costituzionale italiana: Alcuni spunti
di riessione a partire dalla giurisprudenza del periodo 2000-2021. Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo,
[s.l.], ano 24, vol. 2, pp. 191-246, 2022, covering the period 2000-2021 and counting 74 decisions. For Germany
see MARTINI, Stefan. Lifting the Constitutional Curtain? The use of foreign precedent by the German Federal
Constitutional Court. In: GROPPI, Tania, PONTHOREAU, Marie-Claire (Coords.). The Use of Foreign Precedents
by Constitutional Judges. Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2013. and MARTINI, Stefan. Vergleichende Verfassungs-
rechtsprechung: Praxis, Viabilität und Begründung rechtsvergleichender Argumentation durch Verfassungs-
gerichte. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2018. p. 59.
6 The judgments quoted are BVerfGE 3, 11, judgment of 25 July 2012; 197 of 22 May 1979 and judgment no.
1 of 5 April 1952.
7 On the so-called “closed lists” that constrain the ability of voters to cast a preference vote, judgment no.
1/2014 implicitly references comparative law when it states that “the legislation under examination is not
comparable with other systems”, although the Court does not specify which systems it implicitly considers.
Judgment no. 35/2017 quotes this passage of judgment no. 1/2014 and in a similar vein, on the bonus in a
run-o round (infra), arms that the voting system “is not comparable to other experiences”. Again, no explicit
comparative reference is made here. For a critical account, see GRATTERI, Andrea. Il diritto straniero e la com-
parazione della Corte costituzionale: il caso delle “sentenze elettorali”. In: D’AMICO, Marilisa; BIONDI, Francesca
(Coord.). La Corte costituzionale e i fatti: istruttoria ed eetti delle decisioni. Napoli: Editoriale Scientica,
2018, pp. 229-240. p. 232.

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