Protagonismo da Suprema Corte brasileira versus reações do legislativo
| Autor | Ana Cristina Melo De Pontes Botelho |
| Ocupação do Autor | Doutora em Direito pela Universidade de Brasília/UnB |
| Páginas | 13-78 |
CAPÍTULO 1
PROTAGONISMO DA SUPREMA CORTE BRASILEIRA
VERSUS REAÇÕES DO LEGISLATIVO
Whoever attentively considers the dierent departments of power must per-
ceive, that, in a government in which they are separeted from each other, the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to
the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to
annoy or injure them. e Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds
the sword of the community. e legislature not only commands the purse,
but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated. e Judiciary, on the contrary, has no inuence over either the
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment, and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the ecacy of its judg-
ments. (grifamos) (Alexander Hamilton, in the 78th Federalist, “e Judges
as Guardians of the Constitution”)
A Lei é a expressão da vontade geral. Todos os cidadãos têm o direito de
concorrer, pessoalmente ou através dos seus representantes, para a sua for-
mação. Ela deve ser a mesma para todos, quer se destine a proteger quer
a punir. Todos os cidadãos são iguais a seus olhos, são igualmente admis-
síveis a todas as dignidades, lugares e empregos públicos, segundo a sua
capacidade, e sem outra distinção que não seja a das suas virtudes e dos
seus talentos. (Declaração dos Direitos do Homem e do Cidadão, 1789,
artigo VI)
1.1 Considerações iniciais
A judicialização da vida e da política são fatos incontestes no mundo glo-
balizado em que vivemos. Muitos países tiveram que criar novas Cortes e in-
crementar a estrutura do Poder Judiciário para buscar dar solução ao crescente
número de casos levados à apreciação desse Poder.
No Brasil não tem sido diferente. É só acessar os dados do Conselho Na-
cional de Justiça (Justiça em Números 2017) para perceber que existem quase
80 milhões de ações judiciais a serem decididas (casos pendentes), o que sig-
nica que mais de um em cada dois adultos estão litigando perante as cortes.
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Ana Cristina Melo de Pontes Botelho
Fonte: CNJ (2017, p. 5)
Mas a judicialização da vida e da política12 chama a atenção não só em
12 Segundo Ran Hirschl “Works that attempt to explain (not merely describe) the judi-
cialization of politics may be grouped, for the sake of simplicity, into four main catego-
ries: functionalist, rights-centered, institutionalist, or court-centered. e functionalist
approach attributes the judicialization of recent decades to the proliferation in levels of
government and the corresponding emergence of a wide variety of semiautonomous
administrative and regulatory state agencies (Shapiro & Stone-Sweet 2002). According
to this approach, independent and active judiciaries armed with judicial-review prac-
tices are necessary for the ecient monitoring of the ever expanding administrative
state. Moreover, the modern administrative state embodies notions of government
as an active policy maker rather than a passive adjudicator of conicts. It therefore
requires an active, policy-making judiciary (Feeley & Rubin 1998). Along the same
lines, the judicialization of politics may also stem from the increasing complexity and
contingency of modern societies (Luhmann 1985) and/or from the creation and ex-
pansion of the modern welfare state with its numerous regulatory agencies (Teubner
1987, Habermas 1988). Some accounts of the rapid growth of judicialization at the
supranational judicial level portray it as an inevitable institutional response to complex
coordination problems deriving from the systemic need to adopt standardized legal
norms and administrative regulations across member-states in an era of converging
economic markets (Stone-Sweet 2000). In some instances, economic liberalization may
be an important projudicialization factor. In the regulatory arena, the combination of
privatization and liberalization may encourage “juridical regulation” (Vogel 1998, Kele-
men & Sibbitt 2004).
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Guarda Compartilhada da Constituição
termos quantitativos, como também qualitativos, haja vista que, cada vez mais,
questões de natureza política, econômica, social, ética têm seu último capítulo
decidido perante as Supremas Cortes.
No Brasil, a judicialização tanto quantitativa quanto qualitativa tem sido
reforçada pelo fato de nossa Constituição, além ser muito detalhada, também
trazer consigo muitas questões políticas a serem resolvidas por lei. Demais disso,
há ainda fácil acesso ao Supremo Tribunal Federal por meio de ações diretas.
É bom lembrar que foi no âmbito da Suprema Corte brasileira que foram
resolvidas questões de extrema relevância política e social para a Nação, como:
união homoafetiva; aborto de feto anencefálico; construção de usina hidroelé-
trica na Amazônia; publicação de biograas não autorizadas; incidência do
e second approach emphasizes the prevalence of rights discourse or the greater awa-
reness of rights issues, which is both reective of and contributing to what may be
termed judicialization from below. An authentic, ‘bottom up’ judicialization is more
likely when judicial institutions are perceived by social movements, interest groups,
and political activists as more reputable, impartial, and eective decision-making bo-
dies than other institutions, which are viewed as bureaucracy-heavy or biased (Tate &
Vallinder 1995). Judicialization of this kind relies on a perceived contrast between the
relative openness and integrity of the judicial process and the corruptibility of political
bargaining (Scheingold 1974). A well-developed support structure for legal mobiliza-
tion may aid this kind of judicialization by allowing historically under-represented or
disenfranchised groups and individuals to invoke potentially favorable laws and cons-
titutional provisions through strategic litigation (Epp 1998).
A third approach emphasizes institutional features that are, ceteris paribus, hospitable
to judicialization. At a bare minimum, the judicialization of politics requires accep-
tance of the rule of law, some level of legitimacy of the legal system, and a relatively
independent and well-respected apex court armed with some form of judicial-review
power. Hence, the proliferation of democracy worldwide is said to be a main cause of
judicialization and the expansion of judicial power more generally. By its very nature,
the establishment of a democratic regime entails some form of separation of powers
among the major branches of government, as well as between the central and pro-
vincial/regional legislatures. It also entails setting up procedural governing rules and
decision-making processes to which all political actors are required to adhere. e per-
sistence and stability of such a system requires at least a semiautonomous, supposedly
apolitical judiciary to serve as an impartial umpire in disputes concerning the scope
and nature of the fundamental rules of the political game. Active judicial review is both
a prerequisite and a byproduct of viable democratic governance in multi-layered fede-
ralist countries (Shapiro 1999). In other words, more democracy equals more courts.
However, the ‘proliferation of democracy’ thesis cannot account for the judicialization
of politics in non – or quasi-democratic polities, nor account for signicant variations
in levels of judicialization among new democracies. And it does not adequately explain
increased levels of judicialization in stable democracies with no apparent changes in
their political regime” (HIRSCHL, 2008, p. 95-96).
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